Transcript:
RUND ABDELFATAH, HOST:
As evening sets in, on July 26, 1956, the president of Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser, stands at a podium in Alexandria, looking out at a crowd of a hundred thousand.
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GAMAL ABDEL NASSER: (Speaking Arabic).
ABDELFATAH: He’s about to throw a wrench into the plans of the most powerful countries on Earth. At first, the speech seems fairly standard, kind of upbeat, but about halfway into the nearly three-hour speech, Nasser begins to rail against what he calls the imperialists who have mortgaged our future, his voice growing more fiery.
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NASSER: (Speaking Arabic).
ABDELFATAH: And then he repeatedly says the name…
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NASSER: Ferdinand de Lesseps.
ABDELFATAH: Ferdinand de Lesseps, the 19th century French developer who built the Suez Canal in the 1860s, which dramatically cut down the travel time between Europe and Asia.
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NASSER: (Speaking Arabic).
ABDELFATAH: The canal was mostly built by Egyptian laborers. It runs through Egyptian territory, but the two biggest shareholders of the company that controlled shipping in the canal – Britain and France. And towards the end of the speech, Nasser reads a presidential decree nationalizing the Suez Canal Company, putting control of shipping there in the hands of Egypt.
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NASSER: (Speaking Arabic).
ABDELFATAH: At that exact moment, miles away, Egyptian military forces mobilized to occupy the canal offices, taking control of all its assets.
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NASSER: (Speaking Arabic).
ABDELFATAH: The crowd erupts with cheers.
(CHEERING)
ABDELFATAH: Almost immediately, the British and French owners of the Suez Canal Company start freaking out.
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UNIDENTIFIED NARRATOR #1: A new Middle East crisis arises, as President Nasser of Egypt tells a wildly cheering crowd…
ABDELFATAH: The clock begins ticking. Can Egypt and these empires come to some kind of agreement?
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UNIDENTIFIED NARRATOR #1: His announcement touches off a rapid series of reprisals and counter-reprisals.
ABDELFATAH: Turns out, Britain had already been working on a secret plan to try to get rid of Nasser. And now the moment has come to put it into action, a conspiracy that will nearly bring on World War III.
The feeling that we’re hurdling towards World War III isn’t unfamiliar today. And over the last week, the headlines have been dominated by one question – will the latest U.S.-Iran tentative deal hold, and will the oil keep flowing through the Strait of Hormuz? Which highlights an important reality. For decades now, the real power in the region has often flowed through water. Three narrow waterways shape the Middle East relationship to the world, carrying up to a quarter of global trade. Together, they form what may be the most powerful triangle on Earth – the Suez Canal, the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb. In times of crisis, these waterways become chokepoints, a single disruption sending shockwaves across continents, shockwaves that often reverberate long after ceasefires are signed and tensions cool.
I’m Rund Abdelfatah. And on this episode of THROUGHLINE from NPR, we’re taking you to three moments on these waterways that helped define the modern Middle East and rewrote the rules of global power.
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NASSER: (Speaking Arabic).
ABDELFATAH: When we come back, we return to the secret murder conspiracy on the Suez Canal.
FORTSON DESRAVINES: My name is Fortson Desravines (ph) from Silver Spring, Maryland, and you’re listening to THROUGHLINE from NPR.
UNIDENTIFIED PERSON #1: Part 1 – Suez.
ALEX VON TUNZELMANN: When people try to talk about what triggers the crisis, they often come to Nasser and nationalizing the Suez Canal Company in July 1956. But I think that you have to understand the world in which that happened.
ABDELFATAH: This is Alex von Tunzelmann.
VON TUNZELMANN: I am a historian, and my book is called “Blood And Sand: Suez, Hungary, And Eisenhower’s Campaign For Peace.”
ABDELFATAH: A few months before NASA made his earth-shattering announcement to nationalize the Suez Canal Company, the British prime minister, Anthony Eden, had actually phoned a colleague in the foreign office and said…
VON TUNZELMANN: I want him murdered.
ABDELFATAH: So before we dive into what happened next on the Suez Canal, we need to rewind a little to understand what the world looked like back then and how Nasser ended up at that podium.
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VON TUNZELMANN: So Britain and France had been the imperial powers in the Middle East. They’d carved it up between themselves under what’s called the Sykes-Picot Agreement.
ABDELFATAH: In 1916, the Sykes-Picot agreement drew new borders around the Arab territories of the crumbling Ottoman Empire, places like Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Palestine, and put them under the control of either Britain or France. Around this time, a British intelligence bureau was set up in Egypt to monitor its neighbors. And then a couple decades later…
VON TUNZELMANN: Of course, you got World War II shakes up the entire world. After World War II, complex time in the Middle East.
ABDELFATAH: In theory, it was the end of empires, the end of colonial rule, the beginning of a new world order defined by international law and organizations like the United Nations. In 1947, the U.N. drafted a plan calling for the partition of Palestine into separate Arab and Jewish states. Israel was established the following year. An Arab state was not created.
VON TUNZELMANN: That created a lot of instability in the Middle East, largely because most of the other Middle Eastern countries were very unhappy with what they saw as a sort of colonial move after World War II.
ABDELFATAH: The U.S., not a huge player in the Middle East yet, was a big supporter of this plan and helped push it through.
VON TUNZELMANN: The day after the state of Israel was declared, you had a joint force of Arab armies invading, and that first war that kind of establishes that.
ABDELFATAH: News reels from the time show Israeli soldiers driving trucks through the streets.
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UNIDENTIFIED NARRATOR #2: Latest pictures from war-torn Palestine provide these impressions of Haganah forces consolidating areas under their control.
VON TUNZELMANN: And Gamal Abdel Nasser was among those who fought in that war.
ABDELFATAH: Nasser was from a middle-class family.
VON TUNZELMANN: Very, very bright.
ABDELFATAH: Very ambitious.
VON TUNZELMANN: Also very good-looking. Not irrelevant.
ABDELFATAH: And like a lot of young men in Egypt then, who had bigger dreams for themselves, he joined the military.
VON TUNZELMANN: And he really started to come onto the radar of people like the CIA in the early 1950s.
ABDELFATAH: The CIA had been established after World War II and was just starting to build its relationships worldwide.
VON TUNZELMANN: In March 1952, when the CIA operative Kermit Roosevelt was in Cairo, Nasser was a colonel. Roosevelt had a series of meetings with him and actually established that NASA was rather a positive figure from the point of view of American interests.
ABDELFATAH: This is the same Kermit Roosevelt that staged the coup in Iran in 1953?
VON TUNZELMANN: Oh, yeah. There weren’t too many Kermit Roosevelts. These guys were busy.
ABDELFATAH: Yeah.
VON TUNZELMANN: You know, there was a lot happening at this time.
ABDELFATAH: A lot of secret plots and backroom deals.
VON TUNZELMANN: You can’t disentangle it from the history of oil. This part of the world is just becoming incredibly important, and the struggle to control that is absolutely enormous.
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NASSER: (Speaking Arabic).
ABDELFATAH: Meanwhile, Nasser helps stage a coup and goes on to become prime minister of Egypt in 1954 and president in 1956.
VON TUNZELMANN: He was politically positioning himself in a very interesting way ’cause you got to remember, the Cold War was really kicked off by this point.
ABDELFATAH: Nasser refused to align fully with either Washington or Moscow. He promoted Arab unity and anti-colonial nationalism, which made him very popular across the region and threatening to France, which blamed him for encouraging resistance in Algeria.
VON TUNZELMANN: So at this time, Algeria is still part of France. It’s held in a colonial situation, which it’s very unhappy about.
ABDELFATAH: Lucky for France, there was one guy in the British foreign office who absolutely could not stand Nasser.
VON TUNZELMANN: Anthony Eden.
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ABDELFATAH: Anthony Eden started off as a foreign diplomat and eventually became prime minister.
VON TUNZELMANN: He actually spoke Arabic and Persian.
ABDELFATAH: Eden only ever met Nasser once in person.
VON TUNZELMANN: That was in February 1955.
ABDELFATAH: According to witnesses, it did not go well.
VON TUNZELMANN: Eden brought his wife with him. Eden’s wife was much younger than him. It was his second wife, Clarissa Churchill, Winston Churchill’s niece.
ABDELFATAH: Long story short, Eden, who was getting up there in age, seemed to be trying to impress his young wife and started reeling off classical Arabic poetry to Nasser, this young, handsome Arab trailblazer. You can imagine Nasser thinking…
VON TUNZELMANN: What is happening? Why are you saying this?
ABDELFATAH: Then Eden tries to lecture him on defense strategies. He and Nasser start arguing politics.
VON TUNZELMANN: And there he is, kind of losing an argument to a much more handsome, much younger man in front of his wife at dinner. You know, do we think this was maybe a factor? I don’t know. The strength of that vendetta against Nasser was so extraordinary that we have to say it’s hard to imagine there wasn’t some kind of personal element.
ABDELFATAH: Now, this is definitely speculative territory, but she says it gets at something important about big historical moments.,
VON TUNZELMANN: As a Cold War historian, I often have a little motto which is never assume rationality. Never assume that somebody’s doing something for really good, logical reasons.
ABDELFATAH: By the spring of 1956…
VON TUNZELMANN: The British Secret Services were looking into ways to assassinate Nasser.
ABDELFATAH: Around that time, totally unrelated to that, the U.S. withdrew funding they had promised Nasser to build a massive hydroelectric dam in Egypt. The U.S. and the U.K. were growing impatient with Nasser’s foreign policy and decided to withdraw funding. Nasser was furious, and that’s when he nationalizes the Suez Canal Company. Soon after, France and Britain start to set in motion a plan to invade Egypt, get rid of Nasser and retake control of the Suez Canal Company.
VON TUNZELMANN: And, you know, Eisenhower heard about it. They didn’t actually approach him.
ABDELFATAH: The American president, Dwight D. Eisenhower, had been a general in World War II. He’d seen the devastation firsthand. Plus, it was an election year, and he was determined to keep the peace. So he wrote a strongly worded letter to Eden, telling him to stand down, insisting on diplomacy. He then sent in the U.S. secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, to mediate things.
VON TUNZELMANN: He really drove massive diplomatic campaign with the U.N. to hash out some sort of user plan for the Suez Canal Company, some kind of joint running of it.
ABDELFATAH: Dulles was actually making a lot of progress. Nasser was playing ball. It was looking like they were going to be able to figure it out.
VON TUNZELMANN: But at the same time that was happening, Britain and France were not happy with it. They were going along with it to, like, you know, show good face for the Americans and this. But they were also planning what they called Operation Musketeer.
ABDELFATAH: And they needed Israel’s help to carry out Operation Musketeer. The basic plan was Israel would invade Egypt first. Britain and France would then pose as neutral peacekeepers, send in troops and use the fighting as a pretext to seize control of the canal. Israel agrees to go along with this plan.
VON TUNZELMANN: I think we need to remember this is incredibly soon after World War two, incredibly soon after the Holocaust. There’s a real sense among Israelis that this is about survival, and there’s quite a ruthlessness that goes with that.
ABDELFATAH: Alex says they were also interested in expanding beyond the border they shared with Egypt.
VON TUNZELMANN: And they had their eyes on the Sinai Peninsula at this point. I think Israel was far more preoccupied with its own borders, as indeed they are today.
ABDELFATAH: At the U.N. in October, Egypt had agreed to a set of principles for how the canal should be governed. Still, Britain, France and Israel secretly agreed to go ahead with Operation Musketeer. And on October 29, 1956…
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UNIDENTIFIED NARRATOR #3: After weeks of stalemate, the Suez crisis bursts dramatically into the news again, for Israel has invaded Egypt. Britain and France have declared the canal in danger.
VON TUNZELMANN: Initially, Britain and France got together in London for what they said was emergency talks. Of course, this had all been planned.
ABDELFATAH: You can hear the sense of surprise in news footage from the time.
VON TUNZELMANN: Come out of this meeting in London and say, we’ve got an ultimatum. If Egypt or Israel refuses these terms, Britain and France will intervene in 12 hours – very, very short deadline, just 12 hours.
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ANTHONY EDEN: I know that you would wish me as prime minister to talk to you tonight on the problem which is in everybody’s mind.
VON TUNZELMANN: So, you know, people literally are listening to this on the radio and British civil servants are putting their heads in their hands and saying, what the hell is going on? They don’t immediately suspect it’s a conspiracy because they can’t possibly believe that such a thing has been done. One former civil servant wrote in his diary, you know, we think AE, Anthony Eden, has gone off his head. And one foreign office official was asking another what was going on. And the guy said, don’t ask me, and then sort of flicked his thumb at 10 Downing Street and said, ask that f***ing madman over there.
ABDELFATAH: Meanwhile, Nasser also can’t believe this is happening.
VON TUNZELMANN: He kind of said, look, let’s not leap to conclusions too much. Let’s kind of take our time and really work out what’s happening here because it seems so unlikely.
ABDELFATAH: But Eisenhower…
VON TUNZELMANN: Eisenhower did work out very quickly that he’d been betrayed because he knew that Britain and France were planning something like this. The journalist James Reston, he wrote, the White House crackled with barracks-room language, the likes of which had not been heard since the days of General Grant. So I think probably some big swears going (laughter) on in the White House. So…
ABDELFATAH: They’re mad.
VON TUNZELMANN: Yeah. Super mad.
ABDELFATAH: Operation Musketeer had quickly started causing huge ripples and confusion. Even before the 12-hour ultimatum was up…
VON TUNZELMANN: French warships are out there in the Mediterranean working with Israeli ships on joint operations. So it’s incredibly obvious that they’re working together, really, to anyone who’s paying the slightest attention.
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DWIGHT D EISENHOWER: The United States was not consulted in any way about any phase of these actions, nor were we informed of them in advance.
ABDELFATAH: The next day, Eisenhower gives a speech telling everyone to chill out and respect international order.
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EISENHOWER: In the past, the United Nations has proved able to find a way to end bloodshed. We believe it can and that it will do so again.
VON TUNZELMANN: It’s a very pressure-cooker situation, and probably this is the point to mention it. There’s the first major uprising against Soviet control in satellite states. So the Hungarian uprising begins at this exact point, totally separate from what is happening in the Middle East.
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UNIDENTIFIED NARRATOR #4: But the heavy breath of freedom was short, as 20 red-armored divisions sent Hungarians by the thousands fleeing to the Austrian border.
VON TUNZELMANN: The Americans are thinking, what the heck is going on? Why is this happening at the same time? And meanwhile, Moscow starts to think that the CIA must be behind the Hungarian uprising. This is all part of some kind of anti-Soviet move.
ABDELFATAH: So basically, everyone is paranoid about these two crises unfolding at the same time.
VON TUNZELMANN: And this is when people start talking about this could turn into World War III. That’s the word they use at the time.
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ABDELFATAH: Less than a week into Operation Musketeer, things were spiraling way more than expected. The Hungarian uprising is heating up, and on the ground in Egypt, Britain, France and Israel were militarily pulling off the operation, but not without some serious mistakes, which only intensified the diplomatic firestorm.
VON TUNZELMANN: To give you an example, Britain intended to bomb Cairo West, which was an airfield in Cairo. So the idea is you take out the air power, right? That’s always one of the first sort of acts in the war. So British planes are in the air heading for Cairo West.
ABDELFATAH: But at the last minute…
VON TUNZELMANN: A message crackles through.
ABDELFATAH: Saying 1,300 American civilians are being evacuated through Cairo West.
VON TUNZELMANN: So if the British bomb it, they’re probably going to kill 1,300 American civilians.
ABDELFATAH: Eden frantically sends a message to the bombers and says…
VON TUNZELMANN: Change the target. Change the target. Bomb something else.
ABDELFATAH: Wow.
VON TUNZELMANN: Just take that out instead.
ABDELFATAH: Crazy. Like, it’s crazy that you would…
VON TUNZELMANN: Right.
ABDELFATAH: …Just bomb another place haphazardly.
VON TUNZELMANN: Right. Just something else. Anyway, it goes even wronger than that, though. The planes only had 10 minutes to change those plans. They hadn’t been fully briefed, and they mistook the civilian airport in Cairo for Almaza, the military aerodrome, which is, of course, a major act of war. That shows you kind of the levels of chaos that were going on here and the sort of disorganization.
ABDELFATAH: At this point, the U.S. and the Soviet Union both jump into action. These sworn enemies, engaged in an existential fight over control of the world, end up on the same side, trying to force a ceasefire at the U.N.
VON TUNZELMANN: Of course, the problem for the U.N. Security Council is that Britain and France are on it. So there is a resolution brought against them, but because they’re both permanent members of the Security Council, they use their veto, and it can’t be passed.
ABDELFATAH: And then the U.S. decides it’s going to hit Britain where it really hurts – its pocketbook.
VON TUNZELMANN: Eisenhower realizes he has a very, very big lever here, which is oil.
ABDELFATAH: Eisenhower knew that if he forced Britain to pay for oil with dollars, they would soon hit a wall. Inflation would soar, and they’d start to crumble economically.
VON TUNZELMANN: He actually says in a private meeting that he’s inclined to let them boil in their own oil.
ABDELFATAH: It was a form of sanctions.
VON TUNZELMANN: One Labour MP of the time said the only successful use of sanctions in history was the Americans over Suez.
ABDELFATAH: And the Soviet Union applied its own pressure.
VON TUNZELMANN: The Soviet leadership sort of elliptically threatened a nuclear attack on London and Paris. Now, it didn’t go so far as to say, we’re going to nuke London and Paris, but said, if rocket weapons were used against Britain and France, you would no doubt call this a barbarous act. But how is this different from the inhuman attack carried out by the armed forces of Britain and France on an almost unarmed Egypt?
ABDELFATAH: Was it a real or empty threat? Anthony Eden didn’t want to wait to find out.
VON TUNZELMANN: Under threat of rocket attacks, but also with Britain’s economy imploding, he actually pulls out.
ABDELFATAH: And just like that, a little over a week after Operation Musketeer begins, it ends in failure. Nasser, still in power, and Egypt still in control of the Suez Canal Company.
VON TUNZELMANN: Nasser himself was actually very depressed after the Suez crisis because his army had lost all the battles. But actually, he emerged really as unquestionably the preeminent figure in Middle Eastern politics, and, you know, was seen as a hero that had defeated two empires.
ABDELFATAH: The defeat was especially felt by the British.
VON TUNZELMANN: The British Empire was pretty much over already by this point. But I think what it did was kind of end that era psychologically in a huge way. And if you look at how the world has talked about in papers at the time, initially, when people use this word superpower, they discussed three superpowers, and it’s the Soviet Union, the United States and the British Empire. After Suez, nobody talks about there being three superpowers anymore. It becomes a bilateral world, the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and that’s it.
ABDELFATAH: Eden left office pretty soon after the Suez crisis.
VON TUNZELMANN: And apparently, Nasser, when he saw Eden, you know, fall from power, lose his health, he said it was the curse of the pharaohs.
ABDELFATAH: Where does Israel come out in all of this?
VON TUNZELMANN: Some in Israel are hoping that they will hang on to Sinai and the Gaza Strip, two territories that they have occupied during this war. But actually, Ben-Gurion says quite quickly to Eisenhower, we’re not intending to occupy it long term. We’ll give it back.
ABDELFATAH: Which will, of course, culminate in 1967 – right? – and…
VON TUNZELMANN: Absolutely.
ABDELFATAH: …The war that will lead to the occupation of Gaza and the West Bank, the Sinai.
VON TUNZELMANN: Yes, you can see the roots of that at this point.
ABDELFATAH: Many later saw Suez as a long-term strategic win for Israel because it strengthened Israel’s relationship with France, which helped lay the foundation for Israel’s nuclear program. For the U.S., Suez marked the beginning of a new era. As British influence receded, the U.S. stepped into a leading role in the Middle East, positioning itself as a central outside power. If there’s one lesson from this moment, it’s that waterways like the Suez Canal can give an underdog like Egypt a massive amount of leverage on the global stage, and possibly even upend the power structures of empires. The rules that govern the water are more fluid than those on land, and the people who start a crisis don’t always get to decide how it ends.
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ABDELFATAH: Coming up, we travel back to the very first time the U.S. and Iran exchanged fire on the Strait of Hormuz.
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JACK: This is Jack (ph) from Springfield, Illinois, and you’re listening to THROUGHLINE from NPR.
UNIDENTIFIED PERSON #1: Part 2 – Operation Praying Mantis.
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PAUL RINN: The flooding is being pumped out in AMR3. We found a hole in AMR2. The engineers have shored it up.
ABDELFATAH: It’s April 14, 1988, somewhere in the Persian Gulf, and the USS Samuel B. Roberts has just hit a mine. On fire, holes in its hull, gathering water fast…
HAROLD LEE WISE: The ship was buckling and threatening to come in two.
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RINN: However, we’ve got to fight this problem ourselves. We don’t know what the size of the minefield is.
ABDELFATAH: There’s no way for another ship to come to their rescue inside the minefield without risking getting hit themselves, so its 200 crew members are stranded. They have to find a way out on their own, or else sink.
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RINN: It’s getting dark. We need to maintain visibility.
ABDELFATAH: By the next morning, they managed to hold the ship together long enough to get out of the minefield and back to safe waters. Miraculously, no one died.
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RONALD REAGAN: Hello.
RINN: Mr. President, good morning.
ABDELFATAH: President Ronald Reagan calls the captain of the USS Roberts to congratulate him.
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REAGAN: I just wanted to call and congratulate you and your men for such a great job in getting your ship safely into port after being struck by that mine.
ABDELFATAH: Almost as soon as the USS Roberts was in the clear, American officials in the Middle East got in touch with the Pentagon and Reagan to respond to this attack with a plan that would put the U.S. and Iran on a collision course in the Strait of Hormuz, a narrow 100-mile-long waterway that borders Iran to the north and Oman and the UAE to the south. It’s the second stop on our triangle, and the one you’ve likely been hearing about a lot lately. But first, how and why did Iran take control of this strip of water and convert it into a minefield? To understand that, we’ve got to turn back the clock.
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ALASTAIR BURNET: The most dangerous place for merchant shipping today is the Gulf, surrounded by the Gulf War.
ABDELFATAH: By 1988, Iran and Iraq had been at war on land for nearly a decade, a war that began just a year after the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Hundreds of thousands of people died, including tens of thousands of child soldiers, and when the war stalled on land…
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BURNET: An oil tanker runs the gauntlet of air attacks in the Gulf War.
ABDELFATAH: …It spilled over into the water, with both countries attacking each other’s oil tankers.
WISE: Iran was sort of by itself. The smaller Gulf countries were supporting Iraq. Iraq was at the time led by, as we know, Saddam Hussein, and ironically, the United States was supporting him. Iran wanted to disrupt the flow of oil and gas, ultimately money, to the allies of its enemy. And so they would attack the tankers going to those countries.
ABDELFATAH: This is Harold Lee Wise. He wrote a book called “Inside The Danger Zone: The U.S. Military In The Persian Gulf, 1987-1988.” It features many firsthand accounts from people involved in what became known as the tanker war.
WISE: It’s one of the busiest waterways in the world. The numbers vary, but they usually hover around 20% of the world’s oil and natural gas, the world’s energy supply.
ABDELFATAH: So Iran armed small boats on the water and placed mines all over the strait.
WISE: The Kuwaitis – they approached the United States with a request to escort their tankers. They had to be reflagged with American flags in order to legally be protected by the U.S. Navy. This is what became known as Operation Earnest Will.
ABDELFATAH: For the most part…
WISE: The escorts are going along just fine. And in April of ’88, the Samuel B. Roberts was just not on an escort mission. It was just on a normal patrol. It hit a mine.
ABDELFATAH: In the days after the USS Roberts hit that mine, American military officials in the Gulf and politicians back in Washington debated exactly how to retaliate for this attack.
WISE: The folks in the Gulf, the military leadership there, wanted to go after the silkworm sites on land.
ABDELFATAH: Silkworm missiles was the nickname given to a new kind of anti-ship cruise missile developed by China around this time and sold to Iran. It was relatively cheap and could be launched from platforms on the shoreline of the strait. Iran would eventually reverse-engineer the silkworm missile to create an arsenal of anti-ship missiles.
WISE: Military people on the ground believed Iran was acting as pirates. Let’s take the gloves off and put a stop to some of these things. Washington thought the same, but they wanted to be just proportionate and maybe just a hair over, but not too much over.
ABDELFATAH: They reached a compromise and sent the plan over to Reagan, who gave it the green light.
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REAGAN: They must know that we will protect our ships, and if they threaten us, they’ll pay a price.
ABDELFATAH: The plan was named Operation Praying Mantis, and it was set to take place on April 18, 1988.
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UNIDENTIFIED NAVAL OFFICER #1: Evacuate the platform immediately. I repeat, evacuate immediately.
WISE: The orders came down to start at 8 o’clock.
ABDELFATAH: American warships were deployed to attack two Iranian gas-oil platforms.
WISE: They approached the first platform. They warned them first. They radioed to the platforms.
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UNIDENTIFIED NAVAL OFFICER #1: Evacuate the platform immediately.
ABDELFATAH: The clock struck 8. They waited a few more minutes. And then…
WISE: They started blasting.
ABDELFATAH: On one of the platforms…
WISE: The Americans accidentally hit a gas tank. The platform blew up.
ABDELFATAH: At that point, Iran decided to strike back.
WISE: They send out a missile boat called the Joshan. They started attacking an American boat called the Willie Tide, which is an oil rig support boat. Well, the order came down to destroy that boat.
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UNIDENTIFIED NAVAL OFFICER #2: This is a warning.
WISE: They warned them. They warned them four times by radio, stop.
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UNIDENTIFIED NAVAL OFFICER #2: Stop and abandon ship. I intend to sink you. Over.
ABDELFATAH: A couple minutes later, they spotted a cloud of rocket exhaust coming from the Joshan. The U.S. returned fire.
WISE: So for a just second, the missiles were both in the air. And this is the first surface-to-surface missile attack in world history.
ABDELFATAH: Quick side note – the missile fired by the Joshan was ironically an American-made harpoon missile that the U.S. sold to Iran during the Shah era, before the 1979 revolution brought the ayatollah to power, when there was a lot of business happening between the two countries. The Shah had been installed in 1953 after a U.S.-backed coup orchestrated by Kermit Roosevelt, that CIA agent we heard about earlier in the episode. OK, back to the battle.
WISE: The harpoon flew by and it landed in the water 100 feet away from the ship.
ABDELFATAH: As for the missile, the Americans fired…
WISE: It hit the Joshan.
ABDELFATAH: Eventually, the Americans managed to sink the Joshan.
WISE: Iran started launching planes, and one of the U.S. ships started shooting missiles at them.
ABDELFATAH: Meanwhile, American planes were circling above the water.
WISE: And all this time, the USS Enterprise carrier group was outside of the Strait of Hormuz.
ABDELFATAH: A carrier group is a naval task force built around an aircraft carrier that can execute a really serious attack on water.
WISE: The Enterprise had received an earlier set of orders that told them to definitely destroy one of the big ships. The latest orders said it was optional, but they thought it was a mission priority. These kind of things happen.
ABDELFATAH: These kinds of things as a miscommunication that can lead to a ship getting blown up?
WISE: Yes. In any case, Iranian commanders sent one of the two large ships out, and it was the Sahand. Now, Iran would play some tricks with these ships. They would repaint their numbers and swap them around. Suppose you see a ship coming out and it has this one number on it. The next day you see it in a different number, you think, oh, that’s two ships. Iran has more ships than we thought.
ABDELFATAH: The Iranians send out what the Americans think is the Sabalan.
WISE: It had the number that the Sabalan had previously.
ABDELFATAH: Whose captain reportedly had a habit of sending oil tankers a message before attacking them.
WISE: Have a nice day. And they had kind of a grudge against that guy.
ABDELFATAH: An American attack jet flies in for a closer look.
WISE: And the Sahand started shooting at him.
ABDELFATAH: At the same time, remember that carrier group? Well, their jets also started attacking this Sahand, just as another U.S. warship radios them…
WISE: And says, back off. I’m attacking the ship. And they said, you back off. We’re attacking the ship.
ABDELFATAH: The Sahand gets hit from all sides, and they sink it. Iran reported 45 dead and 87 injured.
WISE: And it’s interesting that in the press release, the Pentagon put out that this is a coordinated attack. See the irony? It was accidentally coordinated.
ABDELFATAH: There’s something interesting about that, right? Facts on the ground create a new narrative.
WISE: Exactly. I mean, you’re in media. You know you can’t go by some of these information that you get. Later on, they told the pilot you would either get court-martialed or get a medal for what you did because it was iffy, you know, justification for attacking the ship.
ABDELFATAH: Whether it was, like, a war crime versus an act of heroism.
WISE: Yeah. But they ended up getting the medal.
ABDELFATAH: At this point, the American military was sure Iran would cut its losses and back down. But instead…
WISE: Iran sent out their other big ship. The American planners, they said, this is crazy. Why are they sending it out?
ABDELFATAH: An American plane dropped a single bomb on that ship.
WISE: The bomb went down the stack ship and exploded in their engine room. And the ship just drifted to a stop and started leaking oil all over the Gulf.
ABDELFATAH: And for a few minutes after, there was a question about whether they should continue the assault on the Iranian ship and try to sink it. Harold says people who were there told him the pilots radioed the Pentagon. And Admiral Crowe, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said…
WISE: No. Call it off. That’s enough for today.
ABDELFATAH: In less than 24 hours, Operation Praying Mantis was over. For the U.S., it was the largest air-sea battle since World War II. They had taken out two Iranian oil platforms, two of Iran’s biggest warships and several smaller boats. And although escorts of oil tankers would continue for another year, this operation effectively ended the tanker war, with one notable exception.
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UNIDENTIFIED REPORTER #1: The USS Vincennes shot two missiles at an Iranian Airbus, mistaking it for an Iranian jet fighter.
WISE: It was in early July of ’88 that the U.S. ship, the USS Vincennes, mistakenly identified an Iranian passenger plane as an attacking plane.
ABDELFATAH: All 290 people on board died in the crash.
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UNIDENTIFIED REPORTER #1: The Reagan administration this week offered to pay compensation to the families of the downed airliner. The move was unpopular in the U.S., but it’s likely to weaken international support for Iran’s charge that the missile attack was intentional.
ABDELFATAH: Despite that fatal error, the success of Operation Praying Mantis loomed large, and the U.S. was seen as the de facto guardian of the Strait of Hormuz.
WISE: It really increased the standing of the U.S. military worldwide. It showed the smaller Gulf countries that U.S. was a reliable ally, which was questionable before this operation started. This reassured the world that the U.S. would keep this oil flowing.
ABDELFATAH: A status quo that was in place until the current war between the U.S., Israel and Iran began.
WISE: And when there’s instability in there today, we see in our own pocketbooks how it’s affecting us.
ABDELFATAH: Coming up, we travel to the newest frontier in the water wars, which may deepen that hole in our pocketbooks even more.
TAYLOR: You’re listening to THROUGHLINE from NPR. This is Taylor (ph) from Aromas, California. And I love this show. I find it to be eye-opening, thought-provoking. Thank you all so much.
UNIDENTIFIED PERSON #1: Part 3 – Hostage At Sea.
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YAHYA SAREE: (Speaking Arabic).
ABDELFATAH: On June 8, 2026, a spokesperson for Yemen’s Houthis released this video, announcing a missile attack on Israel. He also declared a ban on Israeli shipping in the Red Sea, raising fears that there will be major disruptions to shipping traffic in Bab el-Mandeb, which loosely translates to the gate of grief.
FAREA AL-MUSLIMI: It can be the word of grief because el-Mandeb is a double linguistic word in Arabic. It can be the way out or the way to get stuck in. It’s the neck of many things.
ABDELFATAH: Like the choke point.
AL-MUSLIMI: Yes. Yes, exactly.
ABDELFATAH: This is Farea Al-Muslimi.
AL-MUSLIMI: I am a Yemen and Gulf researcher at Chatham House in London. I am originally from Yemen.
ABDELFATAH: The two waterways we visited so far, the Suez Canal and the Strait of Hormuz, might be more familiar to you. But Farea has spent a lot of time thinking about this third point of the triangle, Bab el-Mandeb, the narrow passage between Yemen and the Horn of Africa that links the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean. Each story reveals a different kind of power hidden on these waterways. At Suez, we saw how a waterway could shift the balance of power between nations. In Hormuz, we saw how it could disrupt the flow of oil and goods around the world. In this third story, we’ll see something different. A narrow stretch of water can be used by non-state actors to make themselves impossible for the world to ignore. Bab el-Mandeb only really came on the radar of many Americans in the last few years and has become almost synonymous with the Houthis.
AL-MUSLIMI: The militia, the group supported by Iran – they’re originally Yemeni. I personally think the Houthis are a combination of Taliban, FARC in Colombia and North Korea. They’re Shiite Taliban because their extreme explanation of Islam is radical and their worldview of human rights, of equality of women, of the West, of the other is extremely criminalizing. They are like FARC of Colombia because they depend highly on illicit business revenues – drugs. And they’re North Korea because they believe in isolating themselves and everyone from the world. Their biggest dream is to basically keep millions of Yemenis under their control that has nothing to do with the world.
ABDELFATAH: The Houthis came to power in Yemen a decade ago, with a headline-making move.
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UNIDENTIFIED REPORTER #2: Houthi fighters seized control of the presidential palace in Sanaa.
CLAIRE PRYDE: They also took control of state media.
MOLLY HALL: The situation on the ground remains unstable.
ABDELFATAH: This spiraled into a brutal civil war that quickly ballooned into a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran. A decade later, it’s still ongoing.
AL-MUSLIMI: A disturbing mixture of Libya, Syria, Iraq and somehow Lebanon together, all put into one package called Yemen.
ABDELFATAH: In the U.S., the war in Yemen received very little coverage, despite becoming one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world.
AL-MUSLIMI: It was not a domestic issue. It was not an election issue.
ABDELFATAH: But then…
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UNIDENTIFIED REPORTER #1: They burst into the wheelhouse and ordered the crew to lie down.
ABDELFATAH: On November 19, 2023, a little over a month after the October 7 attacks and the beginning of the bombardment of Gaza.
AL-MUSLIMI: The Houthis showed up in the Red Sea.
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UNIDENTIFIED REPORTER #1: But a dozen men wearing body armor and carrying assault weapons jump out of a helicopter and run along the deck of the Galaxy Leader.
ABDELFATAH: A cargo ship called the Galaxy Leader was traveling near Bab el-Mandeb when armed Houthi hijackers suddenly descended on the ship.
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UNIDENTIFIED REPORTER #1: According to the Lloyd’s List, a shipping journal, the Galaxy Leader is Israeli-owned, Bahama-flagged and operated by a Japanese company.
UNIDENTIFIED REPORTER #3: A Houthi spokesperson didn’t comment specifically on the seizure, but said all ships owned or operated by Israel could be targeted.
AL-MUSLIMI: From a media point of view, it was the perfect entrance for them, a Hollywood-style.
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UNIDENTIFIED REPORTER #4: The Houthis provided the video and blurred faces.
ABDELFATAH: Which they released on social media the next day.
AL-MUSLIMI: That was how the Houthis decided to announce themselves to the world. Hundreds of millions of young men and women around the world, feeling senseless, looking for any compass, frustrated partially. A lot of people say nothing will be the same in Palestine and Israel after that.
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UNIDENTIFIED REPORTER #4: They’re disrupting one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes in the Red Sea, where thousands of massive cargo ships travel through every year.
AL-MUSLIMI: Obviously, my immediate reaction was, like, holy crap. But in another way, I was like, wait, this actually can be a huge global opportunity in which Yemen can be redefined from, oh, a poor suffering country into an important country. You know, the Red Sea attacks in 2023 was the very first time since 13 years the world has paid for Yemen war.
ABDELFATAH: Farea says, in reality, the Houthis weren’t even all that comfortable on the water.
AL-MUSLIMI: They’re a mountain group. They hate the water. They’re afraid of the water. They’re caves people. But, suddenly, like, as the whole world, the global, was coming, they saw, oh, water. That can be something. You know? The mountain and the sea in Yemen – they hug each other.
ABDELFATAH: Which meant the Houthis could launch attacks on ships in Bab el-Mandeb from the mountains without ever stepping foot in the water. And they got weapons, drones and maritime training from Iran.
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SARAH KELLY: Now three people have been killed and at least two injured in the latest attack by Houthi rebels on a merchant ship.
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UNIDENTIFIED REPORTER #5: The attacks already leading to a 5% increase in the cost of shipping a container from Asia to the East Coast of the U.S. since October 7.
AL-MUSLIMI: It has started to create an immediate insurance panic. An insurance beyond anything, it’s a feeling. So that feeling was broken. You’re no more safe in Bab el-Mandeb. You’re no more safe in this part of the world, you know? But it was a panic that you could see in numbers. You can see in Wall Street, it was something in which businessmen started to basically worry about.
ABDELFATAH: And is it too simple to say that part of what garners the attention is as soon as a state or a non-state actor begins to threaten money, the bottom line, that’s when, you know, the global community tends to mobilize most aggressively?
AL-MUSLIMI: Absolutely. You had the EU, one of the most inefficient bureaucracies in the world and the most consensus and time-consuming, they started to make a military operation called the Aspides Operation in the Red Sea.
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SHONA MURRAY: The mission named Aspides, the Greek word for protector, involves four countries – Greece, France, Italy and Germany.
AL-MUSLIMI: Ended up until today happening in the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb.
ABDELFATAH: Would you call this a form of political piracy?
AL-MUSLIMI: Yes, yes.
ABDELFATAH: Farea also has another name for it – drone mine diplomacy.
AL-MUSLIMI: They change the rule not just of business, but of war. If they shoot a drone that takes a few thousand dollars, then if U.S. Central Com interrupts that drone with a $70,000 rocket, the Houthis win. It’s a choice in which you can only bleed and bleed, and the other side only win or win. If they hit you, they win. If they don’t hit you, they also win because they created that fear.
What will happen of the Houthis? You will sanction them. They don’t care. Will you ban them from travel? They don’t spend August in Las Vegas, you know? Don’t have bank accounts in Belgium or in New York you can freeze. It also came in a moment where the international law and order is already collapsing by states. It was fracturing in Palestine. It was fracturing in Ukraine. It was fracturing in Syria. It was fracturing everywhere else. And the Houthis were like, OK, we can do it, too.
ABDELFATAH: And Farea says there isn’t such a clear difference between what non-state actors like the Houthis did in Bab el-Mandeb and what countries like the U.S. have done in recent years.
AL-MUSLIMI: Holding a Venezuelan president.
ABDELFATAH: Or U.S. military strikes on boats in the Caribbean.
AL-MUSLIMI: It’s exactly the same playbook. It’s a hostage policy. Hold the entire world hostage. We cannot differentiate it whether it happens in a dishdasha or in a suit.
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UNIDENTIFIED REPORTER #6: It’s a sight to behold off the port of As-Salif. The Galaxy Leader was anchored in the harbor under tight security until recently.
ABDELFATAH: The Galaxy Leader was taken to a port on the coast of Yemen, and its captive crew was held hostage for 430 days, the news media keeping a close eye on things. During that time, the Houthis continued to threaten other ships on Bab el-Mandeb, leading to some casualties, though some countries were given free rein to travel through it.
AL-MUSLIMI: The Houthis buy drones, buy toys, buy a lot of stuff from China. And that relationship is actually quite strong. And there was some intelligence report about the Russians trying to tell the Houthis about information and intelligence on Western ships.
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UNIDENTIFIED PERSON #2: Goodbye. Thank you very much. I’m go home now. Thank you.
ABDELFATAH: The crew of the Galaxy Leader was finally freed in January 2025 in response to the ceasefire deal between Israel and Hamas. No one was killed while on board. A few months later, in July 2025, the Israel Defense Forces said they’d bomb the port where the Galaxy Leader was being held. The IDF claimed, quote, “Houthi forces installed a radar system on the ship and have been using it to track vessels in the international maritime arena to facilitate further terrorist activities.” A Houthi spokesperson posted on X that they, quote, “effectively repelled” the Israeli attacks.
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ABDELFATAH: Since then, the Houthis have been relatively quiet on the water. But in the last couple of weeks, they announced a renewed blockade of Israeli ships through Bab el-Mandeb, and their involvement may soon escalate further, depending on whether the deal between the U.S. and Iran holds.
AL-MUSLIMI: Bab el-Mandeb will always remain vulnerable. It’s the opportunity and the problem of geography. And to have Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb close together, that is an absolute nightmare, actually.
ABDELFATAH: There’s also the question of whether the Houthis would be able to potentially target the undersea cables that run through Bab el-Mandeb, which are essential to the internet worldwide.
AL-MUSLIMI: Then you will start having Google suffer, Microsoft suffer, Amazon suffer.
ABDELFATAH: I mean, as you’re looking towards the future, do you think that that is likely to happen?
AL-MUSLIMI: I think everything is possible. This world is running out of sanity and leadership for the sake of stability. And even beyond Bab el-Mandeb and Hormuz, if we look into the way military and wars and recent conflicts, they really have moved from the mountains and the land into the sea. Everyone is holding each other hostage in the sea. You can be the Houthis. You can be Putin. You can be Erdogan. You can be Iran. It’s all about water. This is the world war of water.
ABDELFATAH: The world war of water, whether it’s the Suez or Panama Canal, a strait in the Persian Gulf, or a shipping lane in the Black Sea or the South China Sea, geography might not be destiny, but it is leverage. And sometimes a few miles of water can shape events half a world away.
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ABDELFATAH: And that’s it for this week’s show. I’m Rund Abdelfatah. THROUGHLINE was created by me and Ramtin Arablouei. This episode was produced by me and…
SARAH WYMAN, BYLINE: Sarah Wyman.
CASEY MINER, BYLINE: Casey Miner.
CRISTINA KIM, BYLINE: Cristina Kim.
DEVIN KATAYAMA, BYLINE: Devin Katayama.
KYANA MOGHADAM, BYLINE: Kyana Moghadam.
IRENE NOGUCHI, BYLINE: Irene Noguchi.
LIANA SIMSTROM, BYLINE: Liana Simstrom.
JULIA REDPATH, BYLINE: Julia Redpath.
SCHUYLER SWENSON, BYLINE: Schuyler Swenson.
AMY PEDULLA, BYLINE: Amy Pedulla.
JASMINE ROMERO, BYLINE: Jasmine Romero.
ABDELFATAH: Thank you to Johannes Doerge, Cheyanne Butler, Yolanda Sangweni and Tommy Evans. Archival audio in this episode includes clips from Thames TV, TRT World and France 24. Fact-checking for this episode was done by Kevin Volkl. This episode was mixed by Jimmy Keeley. Music for this episode was composed by Ramtin and his band, Drop Electric, which includes…
NAVID MARVI: Navid Marvi.
SHO FUJIWARA: Sho Fujiwara.
ANYA MIZANI, BYLINE: Anya Mizani.
ABDELFATAH: And finally, if you have an idea or like something you heard on the show, please write us at throughline@npr.org, and if you’re open to us giving you a call back, leave your number too. We might feature your idea in an upcoming episode. Also make sure to follow us on Apple, Spotify or the NPR app. That way, you’ll never miss an episode. Thanks for listening.